题目：Misrepresentation and the Discrepancy Theory of Learning

主讲人：Malcolm Forster 教授，清华大学科技与社会研究所、美国Wisconsin-Madison大学

时 间：2011年6月3日（周五）下午3：00－5：30

地 点：清华大学新斋353室（校图书馆北侧）

主办：清华大学人文社科学院科技与社会研究所

摘要：Causal theories of mental representation must solve what Fodor called the disjunction problem (1984, "Semantics, Wisconsin Style," Synthese 59: 231□250): If representations inside the head represent what causes them, then they can never misrepresent because they must always be caused by something. There are many solutions to this problem, but my proposal is designed to explain certain empirical phenomena in animal learning that J. E. R. Staddon (1983, Adaptive Behavior and Learning) systematized in terms of what he called the discrepancy theory of learning.